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I.
The Problem and Task. With the success of modern science, philosophers
have been put to the task of clarifying the nature of their own discipline and
the kinds of methods employed therein. Ironically, such a task is itself a
philosophical undertaking so that any final determination of the matter would
appear to lead to the further question, again philosophical, as to the criteria
employed in identification of the method or methods peculiar to philosophy
itself. Initially, we would appear to confront an unavoidable circulus vitiosus
that might lead us to abandon the undertaking altogether. Such circularity
may also be indicative of the nature and methodology of philosophical inquiry
itself, which is to say, a questioning that reflexively doubles back upon itself
in the effort to attain greater clarity with respect to the object under
interrogation. In the end, the incessant and interminable nature of
philosophical inquiry may very well serve as the gateway through which
we are led to identification of precisely what philosophy is and does. 
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Within this essay, I consider the nature of philosophical inquiry by way
of examination and identification of three methodological principles governing
the unity of Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics.1 By “methodological
principles” is here meant general principles governing (1) the aims of inquiry,
(2) comprehension of common features of experience and (3) the hierarchical
organization of the sciences with respect to one another. So by “methodology”
I neither mean nor restrict the use of this term to something along the lines
of a fixed set of unchanging rules or norms of inquiry, as is commonly
understood. Although philosophers have and continue to make use of a diverse
set of methods throughout history (from deduction and induction to analysis
and interpretation), such methods hardly distinguish philosophy methodo -
logically from the several other sciences that make use of similar methods.
From this perspective, it is necessary to identify the fundamental “forms”
of inquiry, as it were, those principles governing philosophical inquiry itself.
From the perspective of an essay on the principles of philosophical inquiry,
one certainly cannot hope to fully capture the whole of the phenomenon in
question either adequately or exhaustively. For this reason, the methodological
interrelationships that hold for Aristotelian metaphysics and ethics shall
serve here as an example and exemplar according to which the larger problem
of the whole shall in part be interrogated. Even so the choice of focus has not
been made at random. From an Aristotelian perspective, metaphysics or
first philosophy may be interpreted as the foundational science of all sciences.
For instance, within the first book of the Metaphysics he there speaks of a
science (episteme) whose knowledge is most representative of wisdom (sophia).
This science is further said to involve a knowledge of the first principles and
causes of all that which is, to which is included investigation into the nature
of the good (to agathon) insofar as the good is itself “one of the causes” under
consideration (i.e., the final cause).2 Alternatively, within the Nicomachean
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Ethics, Aristotle ties human moral character and fulfillment to pursuit of
the good.3 Through contemplation (theoria) understood as the highest human
activity this pursuit is linked to the speculative aims of wisdom so that
metaphysics interpreted as both the science of being and the science of wisdom
coupled with ethics as the science of the good of humanity including
knowledge of how to become good are thereby brought into alignment.4 Here
it seems that the underlying foundations of such an alignment can hardly be
ascribed to principles of induction and deduction alone.   
From the above considerations a number of questions follow. Do
metaphysics and ethics interrelate solely in terms of the speculative and
practical pursuit of wisdom, or are there deeper methodological principles at
work? In the event that there are such principles, what are they?
II.
Two Scholastic Doctrines. In the attempt to answer the above questions
it is perhaps worthwhile to consider two Scholastic doctrines that developed
under the influence of Aristotelian philosophy. These doctrines were
formulated in response to the identifiable interconnections found among
metaphysics and ethics as above discussed and as further asserted in relation
to the two terms “being” and the “good”. For example, within the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle there suggests that the, “good has as many senses as being”.5
This terminological affinity later received a precise interpretation among the
scholastics from which the two doctrines of “convertible” terms and the
“transcendentals” (transcendentalia) developed.
Taken together, being and goodness (as well as unity, truth and thing)
were said to soar above all differences and were likewise said to be convertible,
which is to say, equal in scope and interchangeable with one another without
differentiation with respect to the subject. This is discussed in a number of
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works of Thomas Aquinas.6 For instance, within the Summa Theologica,
Aquinas there asserts that these two terms are really the same in subject
(secundum rem) differing only conceptually (secundum rationem).7 He further
suggests that the basis of this relationship is rooted in human appetite (will,
emotion, desire, etc.) inasmuch as the good is, echoing Aristotle’s statement
in the opening lines of the Nicomachean Ethics, “that which all things desire”.8
In his Commentary to that work, Aquinas explains that the good is enumerated
among the primary things (inter prima), an apparent reference to the
transcendentals, but that primary things are never known from what is prior
but from what is posterior, as a cause is known from its effect.9 This
relationship is further elucidated in his De Veritate. Whereas such transcen -
dentals as thing (res) and unity (unum) express an absolute mode common
and consequent upon being, other terms such as truth (verum) and goodness
(bonum) are said to express the mode of being in relation to an other.10 So
whereas truth expresses the correspondence of being and the intellect, goodness
expresses the correspondence of being and human appetite.
Despite their virtues, these two doctrines have since then had a troubled
history. So even as Francisco Suarez within the 16th century was reformulating
classical Aristotelian metaphysics in terms of transcendental philosophy,
Descartes was already pursuing a new path which Kant would later reformulate
in terms of his transcendental philosophy.11 Alternatively, within the early
20th century in the introduction to his influential Sein und Zeit (1927),
Martin Heidegger there cites these doctrines as central to the historical oblivion
into which the meaning of being has supposedly been cast.12 Finally, among
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many contemporary scholars, where these doctrines are at all mentioned, they
are at best seen as interesting if not somewhat embarrassing scholastic relics
best left to the history of philosophy.  
The scholastic account and its critics aside, what is important to highlight
is the fact that on the basis of these two doctrines a definite relationship
between the two apparently diverse philosophical disciplines of metaphysics
and ethics becomes discernible. This may be seen by further examination of
Aristotle’s remarks on methodology, the pursuit of wisdom and the analogy
of being.
III.
Categorical Analogies. Within the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics,
Aristotle’s remarks on methodology are well known: “Our study will be
adequate”, he begins, “if it has as much clearness as the subject-matter admits
of, for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discussions”.13 Here subject
matter dictates the particular method pursued.  He further suggests that a
mark of an educated thinker is sensitivity to such methodological differences.
So we might expect mathematics which deals with unchanging abstract objects
to differ methodologically from music theory which although having
quantifiable properties is nonetheless an independent knowledge-domain
having foundations in the qualitative properties of sound and aesthetic taste.
The same may be said for metaphysics and ethics. Whereas metaphysics
demands a demonstrative approach akin to mathematics (though unique unto
itself), in the determination of moral disposition and right action within
ethics where the given circumstances are often changing and variable, Aristotle
concludes that the primary aim must be: “to indicate the truth roughly and
in outline”.14
These particular methodological differences are likewise overshadowed
by Aristotle’s broader distinction between speculative and practical science
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developed within the first two chapters of the first book of the Metaphysics
in relation to the discussion of wonder and the science of wisdom. There
the distinction hinges upon the motives of the inquirer in the pursuit of
knowledge where speculative wisdom results from knowledge pursued as
its own end and practical wisdom results from knowledge pursued as a means
toward some other end. Aristotle concludes that the study of being is neither
a practical nor a productive science.15 Alternatively, with respect to the study
of morality he clearly suggests that we seek knowledge in this case: “not in
order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good”.16 Consequently,
we are not to inquire into the nature of right and wrong as detached observers,
as it were, as spectators sitting on the sidelines for then, as he suggests, such
a practical inquiry would find no utility. Inasmuch as the study of morality
has the primary aim of the moral improvement of both individual and society,
to that extent such inquiry ought to be rooted in the practical pursuit of
knowledge for the sake of becoming good.
From the above remarks it is evident that for Aristotle metaphysics and
ethics employ distinct methodological approaches to knowledge depending
upon the subject matter under study. These two domains are likewise
distinguished along broader lines based upon the overall purpose (viz.,
speculative versus practical) according to which knowledge is sought. Despite
this, far more fundamental methodological principles are identifiable. 
In the above-cited passage within the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle there
goes on to list the specific ways in which the two terms “being” and “good”
relate. Just as the term “is” signifies one or the other of the categories including
substance, quantity, quality, etc., so too the term “good” is applied, “in the
category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e. of the virtues,
and in quantity, i.e. of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e. of the useful,
and in time, i.e. of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e. of the right locality
and the like.”17 What is here evident is the fact that the explicit categorical
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interconnections there identified are far more than terminological. We find
instead that between metaphysics and ethics there what might be called
“categorical analogies” between each domain so that patterns guiding
comprehension of one domain (viz., metaphysics) are applied to comprehension
of the subject matter of the other (viz., ethics). In consequence, Aristotle
relates the category of substance to mind and God, and as ethics is further
determined to be principally about virtue, to that extent, he fixes upon the
moral agent as the subject to be interrogated.18
Further categorical analogies are thereafter brought into play. So the
metaphysical category of quality finds analogy in ethics in the form of the
various “colors” of virtue—from justice to temperance, courage to wisdom.
The category of quantity likewise finds analogy with the quantitative analysis
of virtue as a mean between excess and deficiency, and through the category
of relation the mean is determined to be “relative to us”.19 Categorical analogies
are in fact identifiable for every metaphysical category inasmuch as being
and the good are convertible terms—including action, passion, time, place
and so on—and this fact serves to determine the way in which the subject
matter of ethics is thereafter analyzed. 
What we find is that despite their differences metaphysics and ethics
are in fact methodologically united in far more fundamental ways, indeed,
so much so that we consider such disciplines fundamental branches of
philosophy itself. That is not to say that similar categorical analogies cannot
be found among the other branches of philosophy or even among the diverse
specialized sciences. To the contrary, we discover categorical analogies in the
comprehension of the subject matter of mathematics, history, physics, etc. For
example, in Number Theory it is necessary to identify first the substance
or subject of consideration, viz., the integers 0, 16, 1, 85, 427, etc. Quantitative
kinds are further identifiable, as the series of numbers 0, 1, 2 and so on. There
are qualitative kinds as the odd and the even (3 and 2), the positive and the
negative (-2 and 2). There are further relations evidenced in the various
operations including the greater and the lesser (3 > 2), addition (3 + 2 is
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5), multiplication (3 x 2 is 6) and so on. We do not, however, find categories
of time and place as well as action and passion. In other words, whereas
metaphysics and ethics appear to be “convertible sciences”, metaphysics
and mathematics and so too ethics and mathematics do not.20 This is an
essential point that may serve as a basis for identification of the underlying
differences between philosophy and the other sciences. Metaphysics and ethics
appear to share in a “global” methodological relationship that other sciences
simply do not share in to the same degree but only partially, implying a
hierarchical organization of the various sciences with respect to the
methodology of philosophy.
IV.
Teleological Affinities. I have thus far touched upon the methodological
interrelationship between metaphysics and ethics in terms of categorical
analogies that hold between distinct domains of inquiry. Inasmuch as
metaphysics is usually taken to be the foundational science of all sciences,
indeed as “universal” science, it isn’t entirely surprising that the other
philosophical domains of inquiry (ethics, epistemology, aesthetics, etc.) should
obtain a foundation in and from metaphysics. What is often neglected,
however, is the influence of the parts upon the whole. If we consider knowledge
to be a kind of whole, then the parts of knowledge become integral to the
formation of that whole. For this reason just as metaphysics methodologically
informs ethics, so too ethics and the specialized sciences must methodologically
inform metaphysics, albeit in different ways.
To see why this is the case we note first that as a practical science, ethics
will necessarily differ from metaphysics here understood in an Aristotelian
sense as a speculative science. Despite this, a likeness of ends is discernible.
In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explicitly states that in obtaining the
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good we obtain happiness or well-being (eudaimonia).21 Well-being is further
associated with contemplation (theoria) and the contemplative life.
Contemplation is further linked to the pinnacle of human knowledge,
including self-knowledge, found in wisdom (sophia).22 Alternatively, although
speculative in nature, the desire for wisdom at ground to metaphysics is
ultimately connected to both contemplation and well-being. To that extent,
metaphysics is ultimately wed to ethics by “teleological affinity” in the sense
of a likeness of ends.
In the second place, as already noted, Aristotle characterizes the good as
that which all things desire. The good is in turn the object of human appetite,
viz., of desire, want, pursuit and indeed every activity ordered toward an end.
Although the speculative consideration of the nature of the good belongs
principally to metaphysics, the science that has as its aim a consideration of
how to become good is ethics. We furthermore obtain the good first, in the
rational ordering of human action toward an end and second, in the actual
pursuit of that end. 
As ethics seeks knowledge of how to become good to that extent it requires
practical wisdom or prudence (phronesis). Inevitably, prudence dictates the
best means toward obtaining an end. So in mathematics, methods of deduction
and proof are best. In ethics, a rough outline is best, and so on. Prudence in
turn plays an integral part in the foundational development of every science
whether practical, productive or speculative, and as prudence is chiefly an
instrument of the intellect applied toward obtaining the end and as the end
is here determined to be the good, to that extent, an ethical component is
teleologically interwoven into metaphysics and in turn, into each science.23
V.
Architectonic Principles. Turning to the third type of principle, within
the Metaphysics, Aristotle there concludes that inquiry into being is
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principally an inquiry into substance along with the various accidents or
attributes necessarily belonging to substance.24 What we find within the
Aristotelian account of being is a hierarchical ordering of the various senses
of being in relation to substance as their focal point. As already stated, analysis
of any and every object assumes the categorical consideration of first a subject
and alternatively quantities, qualities, relations and so on. In other words,
every object of consideration implies a categorization of that object so
considered. The same condition must likewise hold for the nature of human
knowledge insofar as we take and consider human knowledge itself as an
object of study. This implies that we study the categorical objects of knowledge
in a categorical way. The further implication is that human knowledge is both
categorically classifiable and structured, pointing to a third kind of
methodological principle that I here call “architectonic principles”. 
Although I have discussed only metaphysics and ethics, the argument is
understood to extend to the other branches of philosophy including principally
logic, epistemology and aesthetics. This follows from the further admission
of the convertibility of being, truth and the beautiful. Taken together these
fundamental philosophical disciplines serve as founding domains underlying
the unity of human knowledge. But such a foundation is not to be understood
in the sense of a deductive system where philosophy provides the first principles
and the several specialized sciences are deduced from those principles. To the
contrary, as being is the founding term from which the remaining
transcendental terms are thought to ultimately derive their sense, to that
extent the unity of knowledge finds a parallel with the unity of being.
Metaphysics becomes the categorical “subject” of human knowledge, the
remaining philosophical disciplines serving as convertible branches of that
unity. On the other hand, the several specialized sciences become the
categorical “accidents” ordered around that subject. Knowledge in turn finds
unity through the architectonic ordering of the parts around the whole where
metaphysics serves as both the starting point (first philosophy) and end
(wisdom).
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Before concluding this section it is important to address a possible
ambiguity in relation to the term “wisdom” as predicated of both philosophy
and metaphysics. The ambiguity would seem to suggest that as the pursuit
of wisdom, philosophy is reducible to metaphysics understood as the science
of wisdom. This ambiguity may, however, be cleared up on the basis of the
following considerations. Within the second chapter to the fourth book of
the Metaphysics Aristotle there affirms an architectonic structure for being,
suggesting that: “The term being is used in many senses, but with reference
to one thing and to some one nature and not equivocally.” The example of
“health” is further given where its various uses are found to refer in partly
the same and partly different ways to the a singular notion, which is to say,
“one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it
produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because
it is capable of it.” 25 Such a terminological ordering of these various senses
with respect to a singular and dominant focal meaning the scholastics later
called “analogy of attribution”.26 With respect to the term “being” the general
idea is that the various senses of being including the categorical, the accidental,
the true and the false, the actual and the potential, are all ordered toward
substance (and so to the categorical sense) as their focal point, as it were, the
prior and indeed dominating notion at play.
So too we may interpret the various senses of “wisdom” analogically.
First, we predicate wisdom of metaphysics in a primary sense inasmuch as
metaphysics is the “subject” of human knowledge. Second, we predicate wisdom
of the other philosophical disciplines in a secondary sense inasmuch as the
other philosophical disciplines reflect the “convertible” or “transcendental”
senses of human knowledge. Third, we predicate wisdom of the other
specialized sciences in a derivative sense inasmuch as the specialized sciences
offer knowledge of the “accidental” parts of wisdom but never knowledge of
what unites, in an essential way, the whole. What is evident from this is
that with respect to the claims of wisdom, even as the several specialized
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sciences are architectonically ordered toward philosophy, philosophy is
architectonically ordered toward metaphysics.
VI.
Concluding Remarks. From this rather cursory examination of the matter,
we discover that the ties between metaphysics and ethics are far more
fundamental than an initial inquiry in the matter may have been thought
to reveal. In the first place, we approach the analysis of right action and moral
character categorically identifying the subject matter, working out the
quantitative and qualitative determinations of virtue and so on. 
In the second place, even metaphysics has an ethical component to it. This
was seen in relation to the teleological aims and ends of inquiry itself. Within
metaphysics we seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge but simultaneously
the search for knowledge, through wisdom, is tied to the human practical
pursuit of the good and the desire for well-being. So metaphysics finds
teleological union within ethics in and through pursuit of the good as the
transcendentally determined end of human knowledge.
Third, human knowledge is architectonically ordered akin to a tree.
At the trunk, we find the science of being. At the intersection between the
trunk and the first primary branches, we discover the other philosophical
domains of inquiry. Among the scattered branches and leaves of the tree
we discover the specialized sciences. As the pursuit of wisdom, philosophy
brings unity to the various parts. The various sciences likewise serve as
particular specifications of human knowledge architectonically ordered toward
and around philosophy as their focal point, where metaphysics subsists as the
principle of knowledge and ethics as the guiding thread that directs this
pursuit toward an end.
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ABSTRACT
It is an ironic if not troublesome fact that philosophy, which has traditionally
considered itself the foundational science of all sciences, is still very much in
doubt regarding the nature of its subject matter, the kinds of methods it employs
and the status of its knowledge claims. Whether or not such difficulties can be
entirely overcome, we ought to at least continue the attempt to resolve them. One
possible path toward this end is to consider what unites as opposed to what divides
philosophy. Within this essay, I examine the methodological relationship between
metaphysics and ethics through consideration and reinterpretation of the concept
of ‘convertibility’ as first conceived within the works of Aristotle and later among
the medieval scholastics. According to this view, to say that “x is” and “x is good”
is to assert not a real but a conceptual distinction inasmuch as both terms are
mutually interchangeable (convertible) with respect to the subject. Three
methodological principles governing union of these two philosophical branches
of knowledge are thereafter identified. Following this, I examine the possible
ways in which these principles may be applied to consideration of the nature
of philosophy and the unity of knowledge.
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